---
title: "Payment diversion fraud: PI, cyber or crime for accountants?"
description: "For an accountancy practice hit by payment diversion fraud, whose money moved decides whether PI, cyber or crime cover responds. Four versions and what to do in the first hour."
url: "https://www.hammondpi.com/insights/payment-diversion-whose-money/"
updated: "2026-11-19T19:39:14.730Z"
---

[Home](https://www.hammondpi.com/index.md) / [Insights](https://www.hammondpi.com/insights.md) / Payment diversion fraud: whose money, and which policy pays?

Insights for accountants

# Payment diversion fraud: whose money, and which policy pays?

A changed bank detail, a convincing email, money gone. For an accountancy practice the first question is whose money moved, because that decides whether PI, cyber or crime cover responds.

How it happensFour versionsThe bankPolicy conditionsThe first hourControls

Guidance only. Cover depends on your own policy wording; speak to us about your position.

## How payment diversion happens

A fraudster gets into a mailbox, or imitates one, watches real correspondence, then sends new bank details at exactly the moment a payment is due. The NCSC describes how impersonation and changed bank details are used in business payment fraud ([NCSC](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/section/respond-recover/business-payment-fraud)). Practices are attractive targets because they send and receive payment instructions for many clients.

## Four versions, four different answers

Payment diversion scenarios and which policy is likely to respond

What happened

Whose money

Which policy is likely to respond

A fake supplier invoice is paid from the practice account

The practice’s

Crime cover with a social engineering or fake instruction section. Some cyber policies include it too, often with a lower sub-limit.

Client money held by the practice is sent to a fraudster

The client’s, held by you

Crime cover, if its wording covers money you hold for others. Your liability to the client may also fall under PI.

Your hijacked mailbox sends a client false bank details and the client pays

The client’s, paid by the client

PI for the client’s negligence claim against you. Cyber for the breach response. Crime only if its definition of third party funds reaches this.

The client’s own mailbox is compromised and it blames you for not warning it

The client’s

PI, if the client alleges you owed and breached a duty to warn. The scope of your engagement is central.

## Do not rely on the bank

Do not rely on the bank. The PSR’s reimbursement scheme for authorised push payment fraud covers Faster Payments and CHAPS up to £85,000 per claim, and only for individuals, micro-enterprises and charities ([PSR](https://www.psr.org.uk/information-for-consumers/app-fraud-reimbursement-protections/)). Larger practices and many business clients fall outside it.

## Conditions that decide crime claims

-   **Verification.** Social engineering cover is often conditional on checking new or changed bank details through a separate channel, such as calling back on a number already held.
-   **Sub-limits.** Social engineering is commonly covered for a lower amount than other crime losses.
-   **Authorised or unauthorised.** Policies treat a payment your staff made themselves, after being tricked, differently from a transfer made by someone who got into your banking.
-   **Notice.** Crime and cyber policies expect prompt notice, sometimes within days.
-   **ACCA practices.** ACCA practices with staff must already hold fidelity guarantee insurance of at least £100,000 per claim.

## The first hour

1.  Call your bank on its official number at once to try to stop or recall the payment. If money has gone, the NCSC’s advice is to call your bank on its official number at once and report it ([NCSC, business payment fraud](https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/section/respond-recover/business-payment-fraud)).
2.  Do not reply to the client’s solicitors or admit anything.
3.  Call us. We notify PI, cyber and crime insurers together, so none can later say notice was late or that another policy should go first.
4.  Preserve the emails, headers and logs. The cyber policy’s response team can establish how the fraudster got in.
5.  If personal data may have been exposed, the 72 hour ICO reporting clock may be running. Where a personal data breach has to be reported, UK GDPR requires notice to the ICO within 72 hours of becoming aware of it, and people at high risk must be told without undue delay ([ICO](https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/report-a-breach/personal-data-breach/personal-data-breaches-a-guide/)).

## Controls insurers ask about

-   Multi factor authentication on email and remote access.
-   A written rule that bank detail changes are confirmed by phone on a number already held, never one in the email.
-   Telling clients in writing that you will never change your bank details by email.
-   Staff training on phishing and payment requests, especially before 31 January and payroll dates.

## Review PI, cyber and crime together

One incident can touch all three policies. We check how they fit before anything happens.

[Speak to an accountancy PI specialist](https://www.hammondpi.com/contact.md)[PI for accountants and tax advisers](https://www.hammondpi.com/who-we-cover/accountants.md)

Related: [PI for accountants](https://www.hammondpi.com/who-we-cover/accountants.md) · [Cyber and other covers](https://www.hammondpi.com/other-covers.md) · [Claims support](https://www.hammondpi.com/claims-support.md)
